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ty inflicted affirmative harm on socie-
ty-in Berman through blight resulting
from extreme poverty and in Midkiff
through oligopoly resulting from
extreme wealth." Id. at 2674. By elimi-
nating a harmful use, the takings in
those cases "directly achieved a public
benefit"; therefore, "it did not matter
that the property was turned over to a
public use." Id. In contrast, she noted,
the petitioners' homes in New London
were not inherently harmful to society.
Justice O'Connor criticized "errant
language in Berman and Midkiff' that
suggested the "public use" require-
ment extended to the full reach of the
sovereign's police powers. "The case
before us now demonstrates why,
when deciding if a taking's purpose is
constitutional, the police power and
'public use' cannot always be equated,"
she wrote. Id. at 2675.
Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas expanded on Justice
O'Connor's "errant language" analysis,
arguing that the Court's "public use"
jurisprudence has strayed from the
original meaning of the Takings Clause.
He asserted that the natural meaning
of "public use," viewed within the
structure of the Constitution as a
whole, suggests a more restrictive
interpretation-that takings are permit-
ted "only if the public has a right to
employ [the condemned property], not
if the public realizes any conceivable
benefit from the taking." Id. at 2680.
Examining the history of "public
use" cases, Justice Thomas suggested
that the "public purpose" test originat-
ed as dictum in Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896),
and was incorporated by later cases
without careful analysis. He found a
similar genesis for the Court's deferen-
tial review of legislative determinations
of what constitutes a public use. In
Justice Thomas's view, it was implausi-
ble that the framers of the Constitution
intended to defer to legislative assess-
ments on this issue when such defer-
ence is not accorded in other situa-
tions involving constitutional rights,
such as whether a search of a home is
reasonable or when state law creates a
property interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.
Justice Thomas argued that the
majority's decision was not only erro-
neous, but dangerous. Reinforcing a
point made in justice O'Connor's dis-
sent, Justice Thomas predicted that
the effect of the majority's decision
"will fall disproportionately on poor
communities. Those communities are
not only systematically less likely to
put their lands to the highest and best
social use, but are also the least politi-
cally powerful." 125 S. Ct. at 2686-87.
He noted that urban renewal projects
historically have displaced dispropor-
tionate numbers of minorities, partic-
ularly blacks. Id. at 2687 (quoting
Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public
Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and
the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 47 (2003) ("[iun
cities across the country, urban renew-
al came to be known as 'Negro
removal"').
Conclusion
Kelo establishes that economic devel-
opment constitutes a permissible
"public use" under the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The controversy, however, is far from
over. As Justice Stevens foreshad-
owed in his opinion, the debate has
now shifted to the states, which are
free to enact legislation that would
be more protective of private proper-
ty rights. Id. at 2668 ("nothing in our
opinion precludes any State from
placing further restrictions on its
exercise of the takings power").
Within two months, legislation to
overturn or limit Kelo's reach had
been proposed or discussed in
Congress and in more than two
dozen states. See Kenneth Harney,
High-Court Seizure Decision Sparks
Uprising, Balt. Sun, July 24, 2005,
at 4L.
To inform this continuing debate,
five property scholars share their
analyses of the Kelo case. Their com-
mentaries provide insights into the
practical, as well as theoretical,
implications of the decision. N
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n Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), a bare majority of the Court
upheld the exercise of eminent domain for the purpose of economic revitaliza-
tion. Heavily relying on its previous decisions in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), the Court con-
cluded that it was too late in the game to revisit its present expansive view of pub-
lic use, formally stating that there is no difference in modem eminent domain
practice between public use and public purpose--at least in federal court. 125 S.
Ct. at 2664-65. Indeed, the Court specifically equated public use and public pur-
pose, in holding that condemning land for economic revitalization was at worst
simply another small step along the continuum of permitting public benefits to be
sufficient indicia of meeting public use/public purpose requirements in the con-
text of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Id. As the Court also noted, it is
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now up to the states to decide whether
or not to increase the burden on gov-
ernment exercise of compulsory pur-
chase powers. See Amanda Eckhoff &
Dwight Merriam, Public Use Goes
Peripatetic, 56 Planning & Envtl. L. No.
1 (Jan. 2005), at 3; Steven J. Eagle, The
Public Use Requirement and Doctrinal
Renewal, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 10999 (2004).
The federal bar is presently set so low
as to be little more than a speed bump.
The argument for a judicial hands-
off is not so strong as the Court majori-
ty suggests, however. If it is now up to
the states to regulate the use of eminent
domain for "economic revitalization"
absent blight either of the subject prop-
erty or the area to be revitalized, Justice
O'Connor (who wrote the broadly
worded Midkiff opinion for a unani-
mous Court in 1984) provides a tem-
plate for such regulation in her cogent
and strongly worded dissent. She
observes that the question of what is a
public use is a judicial, not a legislative,
one. 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing Cincinnati v. Vester,
281 U.S. 439 (1930)). Justice O'Connor
commences by declaring that if eco-
nomic development takings meet the
public use requirement, there is no
longer any distinction between private
and public use of property, the effect of
which is "to delete the words 'for pub-
lic use' from the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment." Id. at 2671. Berman
and Midkiff, according to O'Connor,
were exceptions to the Court's jurispru-
dence, which required public use to be
actual use by the public. The Court,
says O'Connor, has "identified" three
categories of public use takings of pri-
vate property: (1) transfers to public
ownership for such as roads, hospitals,
and military bases; (2) transfers to pri-
vate common carriers or utilities for
railroads or stadia (both of which she
characterizes as "straightforward and
uncontroversial"); and (3) the rare
"public purpose" case "in certain cir-
cumstances and to meet certain exigen-
cies." Id. at 2673. For public purposes
such as the eradication of blight and
slums in Berman and the elimination of
oligopoly in Midkiff, deference to leg-
islative determinations was warranted
because the "extraordinary, precon-
demnation use of the targeted property
inflicted affirmative harm on society."
Id. at 2673-74. In other words, these
were exceptional circumstances clearly
not replicated in New London, and the
application of this third exceptional cat-
egory in these circumstances "signifi-
cantly expands the meaning of public
use." Id. at 2675.
Justice O'Connor also confesses
error (her own as well as the Court's)
in ever equating public use and the
police power, from which, she accu-
rately observes, much of the expanded
doctrine of public use into broad public
purpose, and particularly deference to
legislative determinations of public
purpose, derives. Id. at 2675. If, as the
The Court concluded
that it was too late in
the game to revisit its
present expansive
view of public use.
majority suggests, government can
take private property and give it to
new private users so long as the new
use is "predicted to generate some sec-
ondary benefit for the public" like
increased tax revenues or more jobs,
Justice O'Connor asserts, then "for
public use" does not exclude any tak-
ings. Id. Thus, under the majority's cri-
teria, "[n]othing is to prevent the State
from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-
Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory." Id. at
2676. Leaving any tougher standards
designed to limit such possibilities to
the states is "an abdication of our
responsibility. States play many impor-
tant functions in our system of dual
sovereignty, but compensating for our
refusal to enforce properly the Federal
Constitution... is not among them."
Id. at 2677.
States-and Congress-have
stepped up to the plate following the
public outcry that greeted the decision.
Currently, almost 40 state legislatures
have introduced or plan to introduce
laws limiting the use of eminent
domain, or review their current emi-
nent domain laws. For a list of current
legislation, see Castle Coalition, Current
Proposed State Legislation on Eminent
Domain (last visited Oct. 14, 2005), at
www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/
states/index.asp. Local governments
are also taking measures to protect
their homeowners, with several dozen
cities and counties introducing their
own bills to restrict the use of eminent
domain. See Castle Coalition, Current
Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent
Domain (last visited Oct. 14, 2005), at
www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/
local/index.asp. Overall, lawmakers
have introduced more than 70 bills on
eminent domain. Tresa Baldas, States
Ride Post-"Kelo" Wave of Legislation,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 1, 2005, at 1.
On August 3, 2005, Alabama
became the first state to enact new pro-
tections against local government
seizure of property allowed under Kelo.
2005 Ala. Acts 313; Donald Lambro,
Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, Wash.
Times, Aug. 4, 2005, at Al. Lawmakers
in Connecticut and New York "have
called for moratoria on the use of emi-
nent domain until their legislatures can
revise the law to protect property own-
ers." Institute for Justice, With
Governor's Signature Today, Alabama Will
Become First State to Curb Eminent
Domain Abuse After Kelo (Aug. 3,2005),
www.ij.org/privateproperty/castle/
8_3_05pr.html. Even "[tihe city of New
London, Conn[ecticut], has agreed to
abide by the moratorium and allow
Susette Kelo and the other homeown-
ers to stay for now." Id.
Congress also has taken action in
the wake of Kelo, introducing numer-
ous bills that would curb the federal
and state governments' use of eminent
domain for economic development.
For a list of current federal legislation,
see Castle Coalition, Current Proposed
Federal Legislation on Eminent Domain
(last visited Oct. 14, 2005), www.
castlecoalition.org/legislation/
federal/index.asp. The Senate intro-
duced a bill only four days after the
Kelo decision was announced that
would limit eminent domain to only
"public use," provided "the term 'pub-
lic use' shall not be construed to
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include economic development." S.
1313, 109th Cong. (2005). This bill was
pending in the Committee on the
Judiciary. Castle Coalition, supra.
A week after the decision, the House of
Representatives passed, by a vote of 365
to 33, a resolution expressing disagree-
ment with the majority opinion in Kelo.
The resolution provides that "eminent
domain should never be used to advan-
tage one private party over another" and
state and local governments should not
construe Kelo as "justification to abuse the
power of eminent domain ...... H R. Res.
340, 109th Cong. (2005). The House also
passed an amendment to a Treasury,
Department of Transportation, and
Department of Housing and Urban
Development appropriations bill stating
that "[n]one of the funds made available
in this Act may be used to enforce the
judgment of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Kelo v. New London,
decided June 23, 2005." H.R. 3058, 109th
Cong. § 949 (2005). The Senate approved
a similar amendment to prohibit the use
of federal funds for eminent domain pur-
poses. The matter was pending in a con-
ference committee when this article went
to press. Six other bills have been intro-
duced to curb the use of eminent domain
for economic development. Castle
Coalition, supra.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the
Kelo decision, abuses of eminent domain
continue unabated. "Thousands of prop-
erties nationwide are facing the threat of
eminent domain for private development,
and many more projects are in the plan-
ning stages." Institute for Justice,
Floodgates Open: Tax-Hungry Governments
& Land-Hungry Developers Rejoice in Green
Light from U.S. Supreme Court (June 29,
2005), www.ij.org/private-property/
connecticut/6-29_05pr.html. For example,
hours after the Kelo decision, officials in
Freeport, Texas, began proceedings to
seize two waterfront businesses to make
way for an $8 million private boat mari-
na. Id. The city of Arnold, Missouri,
"wants to raze 30 homes and 15 small
businesses... for a Lowe's Home
Improvement store and a strip mall-a
$55 million project for which developer
THF Realty will receive $21 million in tax-
increment financing." Id. In Newark,
New Jersey, officials reversed their deci-
sion to vote against a development
plan that would level 14 downtown
acres to build 2,000 upscale condo units
and retail space. Id. "Officials told the
Associated Press that the.., project
could have been killed if the Supreme
Court had sided with the homeowners
in Kelo." Id. (including other examples).
A Requiem for Public Use
Very little was left of the Public Use
Clause-at least in federal court-even
before the Kelo decision. Although a
growing handful of state decisions and
federal decisions applying state proper-
-3i
ty law found economic revitalization
public purposes invalid on constitu-
tional grounds-see, e.g., County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(Mich. 2004)-an equal number of deci-
sions agreed with the Connecticut
Supreme Court that such purposes
were a valid public use. Gen. Bldg.
Contractors, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Shawnee
County Comm'rs, 66 P.3d 873, 882-83
(Kan. 2003); City of Jamestown v. Leevers
Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365,369
(N.D. 1996). Clearly this is the view of
hundreds of state and local revitaliza-
tion and redevelopment agencies. See
Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain
(Apr. 2003), www.castlecoalition.org/
report/index.shtml.
Whether one reads the Court's pre-
vious jurisprudence on public use
broadly, as Justice Stevens does for the
Kelo Court's majority, or more narrow-
ly, as does each dissent, it is difficult to
argue with the conclusions reached
separately by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas: the Public Use Clause is virtu-
ally eliminated in federal court. What
yellow light of caution the handful of
recent cases signaled has now turned
back to green. Government may once
more acquire private property by emi-
nent domain on the slightest of public
purpose pretexts unless such a use is
inconceivable or involves an impossibil-
ity, the tests following Midkiff in 1984. In
other words, it is now all about process,
and process only.
There is no doubt that state and local
governments will do much good in
terms of public welfare and public ben-
efits flowing from economic revitaliza-
tion under such a relaxed standard, as
they have often done in the past. They
will do so with increased attention to
carefully drafted plans and procedures
guaranteeing maximum public expo-
sure and participation, both empha-
sized in the majority opinion. Moreover,
members of the Court during oral argu-
ment suggested rethinking how to cal-
culate and award "just" compensation
in extenuating circumstances such as
those in New London now that the
Public Use Clause is a mere procedural
hurdle. 125 S. Ct. at 2668 n.21. For
example, other countries provide a
measure of extra compensation when,
as here, it is a private residence that is
condemned and the landowner has a
demonstrable emotional attachment to
the improved land. In Australia, the
concept of solatium provides up to 10%
additional compensation beyond fair
market value in such circumstances. See
Lee Anne Fennell, The Death of Poletown:
The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban
Development After County of Wayne v.
Hathcock: Taking Eminent Domain Apart,
2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 1004 (refer-
encing Murray J. Raff, Taking Land:
Compulsory Purchase and Regulation in
Asian-Pacific Countries ch. 1 (Tsuyoshi
Kotaka & David L. Callies eds., 2002)).
Yet, the Public Use Clause is more
than simple policy; it is a bedrock prin-
ciple contained in the Bill of Rights,
designed not to further the goals and
desires of the majority, but as a shield
against majoritarian excesses at the
expense of an otherwise defenseless
minority-like the Kelos. Surely the
Court could have found grounds to
preserve that shield in federal court. U
PIOIWT, &'E P131;i oln 1' o JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 13
